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Hughes: Negligent Marketing

HAMILTON v. ACCUTEK: POTENTIAL
COLLECTIVE LIABILITY OF THE HANDGUN
INDUSTRY FOR NEGLIGENT MARKETING

INTRODUCTION

Should handgun manufacturers have the duty, as an industry, to
market their products in such a way as to prevent injuries caused
by foreseeable criminal misuse of their products? Over the last
twenty years there have been numerous unsuccessful attempts to
utilize products liability theories to hold handgun manufacturers
liable for injuries caused by accidental or criminal misuse of
handguns. 1 Currently, a theory of collective liability for negligent
marketing is being put forth by a group of plaintiffs in the United
1. See, e.g., Forni v. Ferguson, No. 1332994194, slip op. (Sup. Ct. New
York County Aug. 2, 1995) (unpublished); DeRosa v. Remington Arms Co.,
Inc., 509 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); see generally Note, Handguns and
Products Liability, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1912 (1984). Courts have generally
been unwilling to find that handguns are defective products that subject their
manufacturers to strict liability where the handguns perform precisely as
intended and cause injury only because they were intentionally misused. Id.
Theories other than strict liability have been asserted, unsuccessfully, to hold
handgun manufacturers liable for injuries sustained by independent criminal
use. These theories include negligent marketing, see, e.g., McCarthy v.
Sturm, Ruger and Co., Inc., 916 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that
advertisements emphasizing the destructive capabilities and expanding design
of hollow point bullets could not serve as basis for negligent marketing claim),
and the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine, see, e.g., Delahanty v.
Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758 (D.C.App. 1989) (rejecting the abnormally dangerous
activity doctrine in the context of handgun marketing).
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States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in the
case of Hamilton v. Accutek. 2 Judge Weinstein, in denying the
defendant handgun manufacturers' motion for summary judgment
on the claim of negligent marketing, 3 is considering the
possibility of either adapting an existing collective liability theory
to the negligent marketing context or expanding a current
collective liability theory so that it is applicable to the instant
case. 4 For the purpose of this comment, the potential collective
liability theory will be referred to as "industry-wide marketing
liability."
The concept behind the negligent marketing claim is that, as an
industry, handgun manufacturers have engaged in negligent
methods of handgun marketing that have resulted in the
development and maintenance of a well-supplied black market for
handguns. 5 The plaintiffs contend that since many of the
handguns used by criminals to cause injuries to innocent
bystanders are illegally acquired though this black market, it is
fair to hold the handgun manufacturers liable for the foreseeable
criminal misuse of these handguns. 6 Critics of this type of
collective liability expansion insist that most products can be

2. 1996 WL 465148 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 1996).
3. Id. at *1. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendants
with respect to plaintiffs' products liability and fraud claims. Id at *2.
Explaining the plaintiffs' negligent marketing claim, the Hamilton court stated:
The heart of the plaintiffs' theory, apparently, is the claim that
defendant's negligence in methods of marketing handguns and flooding
the handgun market has fostered the development of an extensive
underground economy in handguns. Through this underground market,
it is suggested, youths may readily illegally obtain handguns which they
then use, resulting in deaths of individuals such as the decedents
represented by the plaintiffs in this court.
Id. at *22.
4. Id. at *23.
5. Id. at *21.
6. Id.
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criminally used and that manufacturers have neither the authority
7
nor the responsibility to control criminal conduct.
New York has been a leader in recognizing products liability
theories and currently acknowledges four separate theories of
collective liability. 8 Part I of this comment will briefly describe
the general principles of products liability and examine the
origins of each of the four collective liability theories and their
application under New York law. Part II will discuss the policy
considerations regarding a new theory of collective liability and
evaluate its potential for inclusion in New York State's existing
theories in connection with a negligent marketing claim.

I. PRODUCTS LIABILITY

A. General Principles

Strict products liability, a relatively new tort theory, is founded
on the premise that persons who manufacture or market products
that cause injuries to others as a result of defective qualities or
characteristics of the product, which make the product
unreasonably dangerous, should be held liable for resulting
damages. 9 Until approximately eighty years ago, a party injured
10
by a product could only recover under a contract theory.
Modem products liability theory originated with Judge Cardozo's

7. See Note, Handguns and ProductsLiability, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1912,
1915 (1984) (noting that many products can be put to illegal use, including

automobiles used in drug smuggling operations or as getaway cars in bank
robberies).

8. Hamilton, 1996 WL 465148 at *18; see discussion infra text
accompanying notes 9-54.
9. Todd Iveson, Note, Manufacturers' Liability to Victims of Handgun
Crime:A Common-Law Approach, 51 FoRDHAMh L. REV. 771, 779 (1983).
10. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916).
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1916 opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company.11 In that
case, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the notion that a
duty existed between a manufacturer and a consumer only when
there was privity of contract. 12 The court held that "when the
consequences of negligence may be foreseen[,] . . ." the
manufacturer of an "inherently or imminently dangerous" product
owed a duty to the user of that product. 13 In the years following
14
that decision, products liability has been greatly expanded.
Today, there are three theories under the products liability
umbrella under which an injured party may seek recovery: 1)

negligence; 2) warranty; and 3) strict liability. 15 To recover
under a negligence theory, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, that the defendant
breached that duty, and that the breach of duty was the cause of

the plaintiff's injuries. 16 Generally, to recover under a warranty
theory, the defendant must have made some expressed or implied

claim about a product that proved to be false or misleading and
consequently has caused injury to the plaintiff.17 To recover
under a theory of strict products liability, one must show that the

11. Id.; see generally David W. Leebron, An Introduction to Products
Liability: Origins, Issues and Trends, 1990 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 395, 396
(1991).
12. MacPherson, 217 N.Y. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053 (dismissing the
"notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of
negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else").
13. Id. at 394, 111 N.E. at 1055.
14. See, e.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d
1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989); Bichler v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982).
15. See generally, Leebron, supra note 11, at 397.
16. See RESTATEMENT
17. See id. § 402B

(SECOND) OF TORTS

("One ... [who]

§ 395 (1965).
makes to the

public

a

misrepresentation of a material fact concerning the character of quality of a
chattel sold by him is subject to liability. . . ."); see also U.C.C. § 2-318

(1995) ("A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who may be reasonably expected to use, consume or be affected by the
goods who is injured in person by breach of the warranty.").
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product which caused the plaintiff's injury was in a "defective
18
condition unreasonably dangerous ... to the consumer."
B. Collective Liability Theories
In a products liability action, as in most tort actions, the
plaintiff usually bears the burden of proving that the conduct of
the defendant caused damage to the plaintiff. 19 However, over
the last fifty years, courts have developed several theories of
collective liability that allow the plaintiff to circumvent some of
the traditional causation requirements. 20 These theories have been
applied in cases where the defendant is in a better position than
the plaintiffs to know whose negligent actions actually caused the
plaintiff's injury. 2 1 They have also been applied in cases where
more than one defendant has acted negligently and it would be
impossible for the plaintiff to establish which particular defendant
was the cause of the injury. 22 Courts have reasoned that, in the
interests of justice, all of the potentially responsible defendants
should be held liable because the innocent plaintiffs would not
otherwise be able to obtain relief. 23 New York courts have
recognized four types of collective liability: 1) alternative
26
liability; 24 2) enterprise liability; 2 5 3) concerted action liability;
and 4) market share liability. 27
18. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) ("One who sells any
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or

consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property. .. ").
19. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 518, 539 N.E.2d
1069, 1082, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 954, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
20. See, e.g., Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 580, 436
N.E.2d 182, 186, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776, 780 (1982).

21. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (1948).
22. See generally, Andrew B. Nace, Note, Market Share Liability: A
Current Assessment of a Decade-Old Doctrine, 44 VAND. L. REv. 395, 402
(1991).
23. See, e.g., Summers, 199 P.2d at 4.
24. See, e.g., Bichler, 55 N.Y.2d at 589, 436 N.E.2d at 186. 450
N.Y.S.2d at 780.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1996

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 [1996], Art. 10

292

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 13

1. Alternative Liability Theory
Alternative liability was the first collective liability theory to be
widely accepted in American common law. 2 8 This theory
provides that the burden of proof on the causation issue shifts
from the plaintiff to the defendants. Alternative liability theory is
applicable where there is more than one defendant, each of whom
acted independently in negligently causing injury to the plaintiff,
and it is impossible to determine which defendant actually caused
29
the injury.
In Summers v. Tice, a landmark California case in which the
alternative liability theory was first recognized, two hunters
simultaneously fired identical shotguns, using identical
ammunition, in the direction of the plaintiff. 30 The California
Supreme Court held that both defendants were negligent,
reasoning that if it was to require the plaintiff to prove which of
the hunters caused the injury, both defendants would be absolved
of liability and the plaintiff would be denied a remedy. 3 1 The
court noted that defendants in this situation should have the
burden of showing that their actions did not cause the damage
because it was the defendants who "brought about a situation
where the negligence of one of them injured the plaintiff ... "32
Defendants are thus held jointly and severally liable under an
alternative liability theory. 33 In recognizing this theory, the New
25. See, e.g., Hall v.DuPont DeNemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353
(E.D.N.Y. 1972).
26. See, e.g., Bichler, 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d
776 (1982).
27. See, e.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d
182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982).
28. See generally, Richard J.Heafey and Don M. Kennedy, PRODUCT
LIABILITY: WINNING STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES § 5.07 (1995).

29. Summers, 199 P.2d at 3 (quoting WIGMORE, SELECT CASES ON THE
LAw OF TORTS § 1 (1912)).

30. Id. at 2.
31. Id.at4.
32. Id.
33. Id.at 5; see Hawks v. Goll, 281 N.Y. 808 (1939) (holding that
drivers of two separate automobiles who independently and negligently struck
and killed a pedestrian could be held jointly and severally liable).
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York Court of Appeals has held that plaintiffs are required to join
all parties who may have potentially caused the plaintiff's
injury.34

2. Enterprise Liability Theory

Enterprise liability theory is applicable in cases where the
plaintiff can show that her injuries are the result of a groupcreated risk. 35 The application of enterprise liability theory in
New York originated with Hall v. Du Pont De Neinours & Co.,

Inc. ,36 where the court held that if the plaintiff could show that
members of the explosives industry had a "joint awareness of the
risks" associated with the production of blasting caps, and that
these members had a "joint capacity to reduce or affect those
risks," then the defendants would accordingly be held jointly
liable on enterprise liability grounds. 37 Industry members, as a
group, may demonstrate a joint awareness of risk to the general
public, as well as an ability on their part to reduce this risk, by
their participation in trade organizations that provide safety
information and set industry standards. 38 Nonetheless, despite the
existence of myriad trade organizations, enterprise liability theory
has rarely been applied outside of the blasting cap industry. 39

34. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 579, 436 N.E.2d 182,
185, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776, 779 (1982).

35. Hall v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353. 378
(E.D.N.Y. 1972).
36. Id.
37. Id.

38. Id.
39. Heafey and Kennedy, supra note 28, at § 5.07 (citing Hall, 345 F.
Supp. 353).
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3. Concerted Action Liability
In Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 40 the New York Court of
Appeals held that concerted action liability arises where the
evidence shows that the defendants had an express or tacit
agreement to commit a tortious act upon the plaintiff. In this
circumstance, only one of the defendants will have directly
caused the injury. Nevertheless, all are held jointly and severally
liable for the injury because all have breached a duty and have
41
acted in concert with one another.
In Bichler, for example, a pharmaceutical manufacturer was
held liable for an injury sustained by a plaintiff whose mother
ingested the drug DES. 42 Although Eli Lilly was a major
manufacturer of DES in the United States, the plaintiff was
unable to establish during trial that Eli Lilly manufactured the
DES ingested by her mother. 43 Nevertheless, the jury found that
the defendant had breached a duty in that it "and other DES
manufacturers wrongfully marketed the drug for use in
preventing miscarriage without first performing laboratory tests
upon pregnant mice." 44 Concerted action liability was
appropriate in this context because it would have been
inordinately difficult for the individual harmed by DES to
determine which particular company manufactured the pills
ingested by his mother, 45 and yet the injury was the result of the

40. 55 N.Y.2d 571, 581, 436 N.E.2d 182, 186, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776, 780
(1982).
41. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 505, 539 N.E.2d
1069, 1073, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 945 (1989).
42. 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982).
43. Id. at 578, 436 N.E.2d at 184; 450 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
44. Id. at 578, 436 N.E.2d at 185, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 779. The jury found
that if the defendant had adequately tested the drug, "the pharmaceutical
companies would have learned that DES was capable of causing cancer to
develop in female offspring and would not have marketed the drug for

problems of pregnancy." Id.
45. Id. at 579, 436 N.E.2d at 185, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
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defendant's engagement in "a common plan or design to commit
a tortious act."46
Concerted action liability is best understood by examining cases
involving drag racing. 47 The New York Court of Appeals has
held that when a group of defendants participate in a drag race on
a public highway they are acting in concert. 48 In the drag racing

cases, all defendants have been held jointly and severally liable
for the harm caused to a third party where the conduct of the
individual defendant who actually caused the harm was "induced
and encouraged" by the conduct of the other defendants. 4 9 In the
past, New York has recognized concerted action liability with

regard to drug companies that have participated in "consciously
parallel" activity or have engaged in conduct that "substantially

aided or encouraged other" drug companies to act negligently. 50
However, the Court of Appeals later modified its view by
holding that "[p]arallel activity, without more, is insufficient to
establish the agreement element necessary to maintain a concerted
51
action claim."
4. Market Share Liability

Market share liability is similar to enterprise liability. Under
both theories, a seemingly identical product is manufactured by
46. Id. at 580, 436 N.E.2d at 186, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 780 (quoting
PROSSER, TORTS § 46 (5th ed. 1984).
47. See Heafey and Kennedy, supra note 28, at § 5.07.
48. Id.
49. Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1968). The
court noted that "[t]he authorities reflect generally accepted rules of causation
that all parties engaged in a motor vehicle race on the highway are wrongdoers
acting in concert, and that each participant is liable for harm to a third person
arising from the tortious conduct of the other, because he has induced and
encouraged the tort." Id.
50. Bichiler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 584, 436 N.E.2d 182,
188, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776, 782 (1982).
51. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 506, 539 N.E.2d
1069, 1074, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 946-47 (1989).
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numerous independent companies. 52 The product causes injury to
a plaintiff who is unable to identify which defendant actually
manufactured the product. 53 The major difference between
enterprise and market share liability lies in the extent to which
each defendant is held liable. Under the enterprise liability
theory, each member of the industry may be held jointly and
severally liable. 54 Under the market share theory, each defendant
is liable only for a percentage of the plaintiff's damages. 55 The
percentage for which a company is liable is equal to the percent
of the market controlled by that company for the period during
which the plaintiff used the product. 56 Defendants cannot
exculpate themselves by showing that their respective products
were not, or could not have been, the actual cause of the
plaintiff's injuries. 5 7 The New York Court of Appeals has held
that "liability . . .is based on the over-all risk produced, and not
causation in a single case. ....
"58 However, the court did allow
52. Nace, supra note 22, at 399-401.

53. Symposium, The Problem of the Indeterminate Defendant: Market
Share and Non-Market Share Liability Theory, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 863
(1989).
54. Hall v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 375
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) ("Joint liability has been traditionally imposed on multiple

defendants who exercise actual collective control over a particular risk-creating
product or activity.").
55. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541
N.Y.S.2d 941 (1989).
56. The Problem of the Indeterminate Defendant: Market Share and Non-

Market Share Liability Theory, supra note 53, at 863. The author notes that:
The [Hymowitz] court adopted the principle of market share liability,
which compels each DES manufacturer to pay a pro rata share of every
DES plaintiff's damages equal to the specific manufacturer's proportion
of the total national sales of DES. Thus, a DES manufacturer that
produced ten percent of all obstetric DES sold in America will be
responsible for ten percent of each DES plaintiff's damages,
irrespective of whether the particular manufacturer produced the

specific DES which actually caused the plaintiff's injury.
Id. In New York, apportionment of liability is based upon a national market.
Id.
57. Heafey and Kennedy, supra note 28.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol13/iss1/10

10

Hughes: Negligent Marketing

1996]

NEGLIGENT MARKETING

297

an individual defendant company to exculpate itself if it could
show that it had never marketed its product for use in the manner
in which the plaintiff's injury was actually caused. 59

II. POTENTIAL COLLECTIVE LIABILITY UNDER A
NEW THEORY OF INDUSTRY-WIDE LIABILITY

A. Negligent Marketing and the Handgun Industry
New York may again lead the country in expanding collective
liability theory. In Hamilton v. Accu-tek, 60 Judge Weinstein
expressed a belief that even if the present collective liability
theories recognized in New York State are not applicable, the
plaintiffs may be able to develop the negligent marketing claim in
such a way as to require the court to adopt a variation of the
present collective liability theories. 61 The court hypothesized that
the New York Court of Appeals might recognize a variation of
the collective liability theories if the plaintiff was able to show
that the collective efforts of handgun manufacturers to flood the
market with handguns has sparked an underground economy
58. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 512, 539 N.E.2d
1069, 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 950 (1989).
59. Id. ("If a DES producer satisfies its burden of proof of showing that it
was not a member of the market of DES sold for pregnancy use, disallowing
exculpation would be unfair and unjust.").
60. 1996 WL 465148 at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 1996).
61. Id. at *23. The court stated that:
If the underlying cause of the injuries is the unchecked growth of the
underground handgun market, and not an individual negligent sale of a
particular gun by a particular defendant to a particular licensed dealer,
then the New York Court of Appeals might find a market share theory
or some variant to be viable even if the manufacturer of the gun used to
commit the killing were known.
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where those with a desire to commit crimes are able to acquire
handguns. 62 Even in a situation where the plaintiff can identify
the individual manufacturer of the handgun that caused the
injury, a claim could still be made for industry-wide liability if
there is a showing "that a particular manufacturer's negligence
alone would have been insufficient to foster the growth of the
underground gun market to the extent that the individual shooter
63
could obtain the manufacturer's gun."
Among the plaintiffs in Hamilton are Freddie Hamilton and
Katina Johnstone. 64 Freddie Hamilton lost her son, Njuzi, to
handgun violence on July 27, 1993.65 The handgun used to kill
Njuzi Hamilton has never been recovered, but police
investigators have determined that the gun "was probably either a
Beretta or a Taurus 9 millimeter handgun."66 Katina Johnstone's
husband was killed by a legally purchased Smith & Wesson
revolver. 67 The revolver was stolen from the legitimate purchaser
two weeks before the shooting of Johnstone. 68 The lawsuit names
as defendants forty-nine handgun manufacturers who sell and/or
69
distribute handguns in the United States.
In arriving at its decision to the deny the defendants' motion
for summary judgment, the court recognized its responsibility as
62. Id. The court noted that the plaintiffs have been able to gather

extensive material during discovery "that focuses primarily on coordinated
industry activities in opposing government efforts to impose more stringent
controls on firearm sales and distribution." Id. at *4. These activities include:
1) membership in trade organizations; 2) lobbying efforts; and 3) marketing
and distribution. Id. at *4-5.
63. Hamilton, 1996 WL 465148 at *23.
64. Id. at *2. Ms. Johnstone, the administrator of her husband's estate,
together with Ms. Hamilton, the administrator or her son's estate, filed suit in
January 1995 both as representatives of the estates and as individuals injured
by the defendants. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. The circumstances surrounding how the handguns came into the
possession of the shooters vary significantly among the plaintiffs.
68. Id. Mr. Johnstone's killer has been arrested, tried, and convicted. Id.
69. Id. at *3. The plaintiffs chose not to join the actual shooters or any
owners or dealers who may have had control of the handguns prior to the
shootings. Id.
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a federal district court to rule as it believes the state's highest
court would rule on the novel questions of law. 70 Judge
Weinstein examined in detail each of the collective liability
theories currently recognized in New York, 7 1 and noted that the
New York Court of Appeals has and continues to be in the
forefront of recognizing new and innovative theories concerning
72
products liability, tort law, and collective liability.
The court found three factors present in all existing collective
liability theories. 73 First, plaintiffs must show that it would be
impossible or extremely difficult to determine the actual
74
manufacturer responsible for causing injury to the plaintiff.
Second, all the handgun manufacturers named as defendants must
be shown to have engaged in some sort of tortious behavior.
Third, the plaintiffs would need to show that "the problems of
proof are related to the conduct" of the defendants. 75 The court
concluded that it was not likely that the New York Court of
Appeals would adopt enterprise or concerted action liability in the
instant case. 76 Looking to the facts developed by the plaintiffs at
the time of the decision, Judge Weinstein held that if the Court of
Appeals were to adopt any theory of collective liability, it was
77
likely to be a variant of market share or alternative liability.
Additionally, the court noted that the Court of Appeals "has
looked to other states for collective liability theories that best fit
particular cases where no theory previously adopted in New York
was deemed suitable." 78 Accordingly, the court's analysis
included an examination of the New Jersey Supreme Court's
70. Id. at *16 (citing DeWeeth v. Balding, 38 F.3d 1266, 1275 (1994)).

Additionally, the court noted that federal district courts are not bound by the

holdings in lower state courts which the district court finds likely to be
reversed on appeal. Id. (citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate of
Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967)).
71. Id. at *18-20; see supra notes 9-59 and accompanying text.
72. Hamilton, 1996 WL 465148 at "18-20.
73. Id. at *26.

74. Id.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id. at *24.
Id.
Id. at *20.
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1989 decision in Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories,7 9 and
concluded that New Jersey was open to the possibility of adopting
variants of market share liability. 80 In Shackil, a lower New
Jersey court, using a risk-modified market share theory, found
for the plaintiffs in a case involving the vaccine for diphtheria,
pertussis, and tetanus. 8 1 The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed
the lower court for public policy reasons concerning the future
availability of vaccines, but stated that the case could "come to
represent the exception rather than the rule" regarding its reaction
to market share liability variants. 82 Judge Weinstein also took
note of a California decision in which the court rejected market
share liability, finding it unfair to hold all manufacturers liable
when in reality only one actually caused the injury to the
plaintiff. 83
The court's decision not to grant summary judgment to the
defendants was in keeping with its contention that it was not clear
at this point whether or not the New York Court of Appeals
would expand collective liability theory based on the facts in this
case. 84 The court found that many of the elements on which New
York Court of Appeals had based its decision in Hymowitz v. Eli
Lilly & Co. 85 were analogous to elements of the instant case.

B. Possible Effects of Recognizing an Industry-Wide Liability
Theory

Current collective liability theories do not provide a remedy to
an injured party unless there is a strong connection between the
plaintiff's injury and the actions of the defendant. Industry-wide
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

530 A.2d 1287 (N.J. App. Div. 1987).

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co., 144 Cal. App. 3d 583 (1983).
Hamilton, 1996 WL 465148 at *24.

85. 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, cert. denied,
493 U.S. 944 (1989).
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liability would allow recovery where there is a less direct but still
substantial connection between the plaintiff's injury and the
defendant's action. 86 The direct link requirement in the causation
element of typical negligence claims is somewhat analogous to
the privity of contract requirement of the early 1900's. 87 It was
once held that because there was no contractual link between the
injured consumer and the manufacturer of the defective product
there could be no recovery. 88 This privity requirement resulted in
the immunity of manufacturers from liability, no matter how
foreseeable the injury or how unreasonably dangerous the product
was to the ultimate consumer. 89 This doctrine has since been
abandoned because the result did not serve the interests of
justice. 90 The situation with handgun manufacturers is similar.
Although it is foreseeable that criminals will acquire handguns
and inflict injury on innocent third parties, the law currently
provides no remedy by which handgun manufacturers can be held
liable where the weapon is not defective. 9 1 The handgun industry
has been allowed to shield itself from liability, insisting it can not
be held responsible for the criminal conduct of others no matter
92
how unreasonable the industry's business practices may be.
One of the policy reasons for recognizing a collective liability
theory against the handgun industry in a negligent marketing
claim is that manufacturers are in a better position than victims to
absorb or spread the cost. 93 Moreover, handgun manufacturers

86. Id.
87. See Leebron, supra note 11, at 395.
88. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916).
89. Leebron, supra note 11, at 396.
90. Id. at 397.
91. Paul R. Bonny, Note, Manufacturers' Strict Liability for Handgun
Injuries:An Economic Analysis, 73 GEO. L.J. 1437 (1985) ("No court or jury
has yet allowed recovery against a manufacturer for injuries caused by a
properly functioning handgun. .. ").
92. Michael J. Folio, The Politics of Strict Liability: Holding
Manufacturers of Nondefective Saturday Night Special Handguns Strictly
Liable After Kelley v. R. G. Industries, 16 HAMUItNE L. REV. 147, 160 (1992).
93. Bonny, supra note 91, at 1438.
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should be liable for the costs associated with their products.
Current policies allow an industry making huge profits from the
production and sale of handguns to be immune from liability to
those innocent parties who are foreseeably injured by
handguns. 94 By adopting a theory of industry-wide liability, the
courts can correct this situation and hold those who benefit the
most from the sale of handguns liable to those injured the most
by the use of handguns.
Another benefit gained by adopting an industry-wide liability
theory with regard to manufacturers of handguns is that it will
prompt research into ways to keep handguns out of the hands of
criminals. 95 Once the handgun industry is responsible for the true
cost of the handguns that reach the hands of criminals, the
handgun industry will likely increase efforts to find ways to
safeguard handguns from criminal misuse. 96 Safety devices or
procedures which are not economically attractive in a climate of
immunity from liability may become viable when handgun
producers are responsible for compensation of innocent third
parties for injuries due to handgun violence. 97 Intensified efforts
by the handgun industry, combined with efforts of the
government and law enforcement to keep handguns away from
criminals, might drastically reduce handgun violence. 98 Under
current policies, handgun manufacturers have the same exposure

Intuitively, it seems fairer to require handgun manufacturers to bear
these exorbitant costs rather than force individual victims to suffer
without compensation. Handgun users, who inflict the injuries, are
logically the most appropriate people to bear the costs, but they are
often judgment proof. Thus, manufacturers may be the most suitable
group to bear the cost of handgun injury.

Id.
94. Folio, supra note 92.
95. Note, Absolute Liability for Ammunition Manufacturers, 108 HARV.

L. REv. 1679,
96. Id. at
97. Id.
98. Id. at
firearms[,] ...

1691 (1995).
1691-92.
1691 ("If liability reduced the prevalence of legally owned
research suggests that gun prevalence among criminals would

also decrease .... ).
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to liability if a handgun is legitimately purchased by a policeman
or if purchased on the black-market by a serial killer. Adoption
of a theory of industry-wide liability could end this aberration. 9 9
On the other hand, recognition of industry-wide liability would
likely reduce the number of handgun manufacturers doing
business in the United States. 100 The exposure of the handgun
manufacturing industry to increased liability would likely lead
manufacturers to purchase additional insurance at higher prices.
Theoretically, the higher costs would be passed on to the
consumer. 10 1 Higher prices could reduce the number of handguns
purchased legally. 102 Handgun industry marketing and
distribution reforms, which are sure to follow new liability
exposure, could drive down the number of guns produced that are
eventually supplied to the black market. 103 Combined, these
factors could dramatically shrink the handgun industry, limit the
variety of handguns available, and increase the price of handguns
legitimately purchased by law-abiding American citizens. 104
Drastic reductions in handgun purchases could result in plant
closings. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of jobs could potentially
be eliminated. 105
The imposition on the handgun industry of collective liability
would have the same effect when applied to other industries. It is
plausible that tobacco companies could be held liable for the costs
of cigarettes which are purchased illegally by children. In a claim
similar to the instant claim, future plaintiffs could assert that the
tobacco industry "flooded" the market to the point where it was
possible for children to obtain cigarettes through an underground
economy. The spouse of a cancer victim who had been addicted
99. Folio, supra note 92.
100. Bonny, supra note 91, at 1459.
101. Absolute Liability for Ammunition Manufacturers, supra note 95, at

1690 ("In competitive markets, the cost of a liability rule is passed on to the
consumer in the form of higher prices.").
102. Bonny, supra note 91, at 1456.

103. Absolute Liability for Ammunition Manufacturers, supra note 95, at
1691.
104. Bonny, supra note 91, at 1459.
105. Id.
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to cigarettes as a child could claim to have been harmed by the
negligent marketing of the tobacco industry. If courts entertained
such liability, the costs to American manufacturing and the loss
of manufacturing jobs would be astronomical.
Moreover, the adoption of a collective liability theory for the
handgun manufacturing industry may be inconsistent with
existing public policy. As foreseeable as illegal handgun violence
may be, it still is accomplished by the criminal actions of
someone not under the control of the group being held liable. 106
It would be unwise to adopt a policy that allows the independent
acts of criminals to potentially force the makers of legal products
out of business. 10 7 Moreover, the unilateral adoption by
American courts of collective liability for the handgun industry
could hamper the ability of American products to compete
globally due to increased costs of production. Finally, federal and
state legislatures have been entrusted with the power to enact
laws which could be designed to secure many of the social
benefits envisioned by the court's possible adoption of a
collective liability theory for handgun manufacturers. Holding
handgun manufacturers collectively liable under a negligent
marketing theory can be viewed as a means for the courts to
"legislate from the bench," thereby circumventing the legislative
process. 108

106. Folio, supra note 92, at 160.
107. See Bonny, supra note 91, at 1459-60 ("If after imposing strict
liability[,] people purchase fewer handguns and some companies go out of

business, efficiency has been improved and, because handgun victims are
assured ompensation, everyone is better off.").
108. See McCarthy v. Sturm, Ruger and Co., Inc., 916 F. Supp. 366
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). Judge Baer, in dismissing plaintiffs' negligent marketing
claim against an ammunition manufacturer for failure to state a claim, noted
that the plaintiffs' "claims seek legislative reforms that are not properly
addressed to the judiciary." Id. at 372. He continued, "I was a member of the
New York legislature. As judges, though, we []are constrained to leave
legislating to that branch of government." Id.
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CONCLUSION

A new theory of collective liability for the handgun
manufacturing industry should not be adopted in New York. The
effect of holding handgun manufacturers liable for independent
criminal acts would be devastating. Once the handgun industry is
held collectively liable for negligent marketing, the theory of
collective liability could be expanded to reach manufacturers of
other products that could be foreseeably misused by criminals to
injure innocent third parties. Liability would have no bounds and
courts would be crushed by the volume of new claims filed under
a negligent marketing theory. Individual manufacturers would not
only be responsible for their own negligence, but for that of
every member of the industry and for the criminal conduct of
those not under their authority or control. It is poor social policy
to hold manufacturers liable for independent criminal activity and
poor economic policy to dramatically increase costs to American
manufacturers.
Tyrone Hughes
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